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Evaluating governance reforms of international financial regulation, proposals for 
deepening reforms and a role for the Commonwealth 
 
Introduction 
 In the wake of the major 2007-2009 global financial crisis, the most severe since the 
1930s, the effectiveness of financial regulation has been called into question. Fundamental 
discussions -and quite significant reforms of financial regulation - are taking place, both 
within countries and internationally.  
 
2. Global institutions which provide the international standards and rules for the world 
are increasingly important as financial markets have become increasingly integrated across 
borders.  Yet they have also been - and been seen to be - undemocratic and of reduced 
effectiveness since developing countries were not represented in the relevant fora. This was 
clearly recognized by the Group of Twenty leaders, when in their November 2008 statement, 
they said “Emerging and developing countries, including the poorest ones, should have 
greater voice and representation. The Financial Stability Forum must expand urgently to a 
broader membership of emerging economies and other major standard setting bodies should 
promptly review their membership.”  
 
3. Following the crisis, and the G-20’s reaction to it, significant reforms have taken 
place in 2009 to include members from developing countries for the first time in regulatory 
financial bodies. In the following sections the paper will first examine these reforms and 
suggest further improvements that would not only improve governance but also make 
regulation more effectively support global and national financial stability. The paper also 
makes suggestions for a possible role for Commonwealth countries and the secretariat in 
improving the global regulatory system and supporting each other. The paper will then 
examine broad principles for regulatory reform and discuss how global regulation could be 
strengthened, including through the possible creation of a global regulator.  
 
A Critique of Past Governance 
4. In the years leading up to the current global financial crisis, critique of the 
composition of global financial regulatory institutions was widespread. In 2002, the United 
Nations International Conference on Financing for Development produced what was known 
as the Monterrey Consensus. Among the many points agreed by over fifty Heads of State and 
two hundred Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Development and Trade was that the 
institutions of global financial governance such as the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Forum 
should “…enhance their outreach and consultation with developing countries…” and should 
“…review their membership to allow for adequate participation of developing countries.” 
The lack of any developing country representation had before and since been critiqued 
extensively by the Commonwealth Finance Ministers, and since the late nineties by various 
academics and NGOs around the world. Similarly, developing countries had repeatedly 
voiced their wish to be represented in bodies that designed regulatory standards (such as 
Basel banking regulation), which they then had to implement in their own economies. While 
the BIS expanded its membership somewhat,1 institutions such as the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) continued until 
                                                           
1 Not only did the BIS expand its central bank membership, in 2006 it also included central bank governors from developing 
countries (Mexico and China) on its Board of Directors. Furthermore, currently, the Chairman of the Board of BIS is the 




recently to exclude any formal participation from developing countries. An exception was 
IOSCO (the securities regulator) which had a broad country membership. However, its 
Technical Committee - where the key regulatory initiatives stem from - had only exclusively 
OECD countries as members. 
 
5. Because of the BCBS’ important and authoritative role in setting the international 
banking standards for the world, it received the lion’s share of the critique. The Basel 
Committee’s exclusion of developing countries, it was pointed out, distorted and biased the 
policies designed. As a result they were both ineffective to help achieve financial stability 
and contrary to the interests of the developing world.2 It is interesting that the former Director 
of the UK Financial Stability Authority, Howard Davies, pointed out that many countries 
with large financial sectors (including developing countries) were then not members of the 
Basel Committee, and argued that membership should be revised.3 In spite of all this 
criticism, there was no reform of governance of international regulatory bodies, till the global 
crisis and G-20 November Statement led to rather significant changes. 
 
6. Most relevant in the context of the 2009 meeting of Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors are the guiding principles defined in the June 2008 
Marlborough House Statement on Reform of International Institutions. These principles refer 
to both reform of existing, and construction of new, international institutions, where 
necessary. The Marlborough House Statement starts from the premise that “well designed 
international institutions have a fundamental role to support all countries to meet their 
economic, political, humanitarian and security challenges.” The principles include: 1) 
legitimacy (not only to their member status, but also to the wider international community  to 
command confidence and commitment), 2) fair representation of all countries (giving them 
equal voice), 3) responsiveness, so the interests of all members, including the smallest and 
poorest, are listened to and reflected in decision-making, 4) flexibility, to respond to new 
challenges and global realities, national priorities, and specific circumstances of member 
status 5) transparency and accountability, to the entire membership and wider public and 6) 
effectiveness, and capability to address current global challenges. As the paper evaluates 
recent and suggested reforms, it will emphasise how these governance arrangements match or 
not the above Marlborough House principles.  
 
Problems Generated by the Old System 
7. Deficiencies in the governance of the international financial regulatory institutions 
generated a number of weaknesses in regulation. This view is based on a simple but 
important point: the composition of representatives with a governance institution has a 
bearing on its decision-making. This relationship has been well established in literature on the 
IMF, whereby voting rights at the Executive Board influence the institutions decisions.4 
There was a similar effect in regulatory bodies, which were made less effective for 
supporting global financial stability by their very skewed governance structure.  
                                                           
2 See  for example Stephany Griffith-Jones and Avinash Persaud, “The Pro-cyclical Impact of Basle II on Emerging Markets 
and its Political Economy” in Joseph Stiglitz and José Antonio Ocampo (Eds.), Capital Market Liberalization and 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
3 See Howard Davies, “A Review of the Review”, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments Vol. 14, No. 5 (December 
2005), pp. 247-252.  
4 See Cyrus Rustomjee, “Why Developing Countries Need a Stronger Voice” in Finance and Development. September 2004; 
Cyrus Rustomjee (2005) Improving Southern Voice on IMF Board: Quo Vadis Shareholders?; also Ngaire Woods and 
Domenico Lombardi (2006) “Uneven patterns of Governance: How developing countries are represented in the IMF?” 





8. As a result, while the system of informal information sharing, coordination and 
communication witnessed some advances, the formal regulatory policies pursued were 
inadequate. This reflected a strong set of incentives to promote the financial services sector 
that competed with the focus to manage risks within it, especially for countries with extensive 
and sophisticated financial sectors. Under-regulation meant that systemic risk was allowed to 
build up.  
 
9. Changes to the country composition of regulatory bodies during this period could have 
meant that concentrated interests would have been diluted. Many of the approaches taken, 
such as the drive toward quantitative, model-driven, and fundamentally microeconomic 
approaches to risk reflected a confidence that large banks could measure risk parameters 
themselves, view that was pushed by the large banks. As discussed below, this implied 
embedding the main market failure of financial markets, pro-cyclicalty into bank regulation, 
which on the contrary should be counter-cyclical. Several major developing countries were 
much more skeptical of such approaches, their feasibility and effectiveness, and were more 
fearful of the pro-cyclical dimensions of the regulations developed (i.e. their capacity to 
exacerbate swings in the economic cycle). Perhaps above all, developing countries had 
experienced a series of financial crises and were therefore far more aware of their costs, and 
gave a higher priority to crisis prevention. Had they been allowed a seat at the BCBS and 




Recent Reforms: Important Steps in the Right Direction 
10. In the midst of the global financial crisis, there have finally been significant expansions 
of the memberships of global financial regulatory institutions. These reforms demonstrate 
that global financial regulatory institutions can  reform their memberships in response to 
constructive suggestions.6 In the context of a major crisis in the core countries, the 
collaboration of developing countries is needed to resolve the dilemmas of both legitimacy 
and effectiveness of these institutions. Following the Washington G-20 Summit in November 
2008, which as described above, clearly encouraged the international financial standard 
setting bodies to review their governance, a number of important institutions expanded their 
memberships, particularly to developing and emerging countries. As pointed out, previously 
most of these bodies had no participation from developing countries. Table 1 summarizes 
these changes in the public regulatory bodies. Early in 2009, the Technical Committee of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions Organization (IOSCO), which before 
had no developing country members aside from Mexico, expanded its membership to include 
Brazil, India, and China.7 In March 2009, approaching the deadline set by the G-20 for 
reform, two more expansions occurred. Firstly the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
expanded its membership to include developing countries for the first time, adding Brazil, 
China, India, South Korea, and Mexico in addition to Australia and Russia. In June 2009, the 
                                                           
5For a more detailed discussion, see Griffith-Jones and Young, “Institutional Incentives and Geopolitical Representation in 
Global Financial Governance,” 2009. www.policy dialogue.org 
6 See David Held and Kevin Young, “Global Financial Governance: Principles for Reform” LSE Ideas: Special Report on 
the Financial Crisis (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, March 2009) pp. 13-18. 
7 Private international standard-setting bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) also expanded 
their membership, committing to an expansion from 14 to 16 members, and guaranteed some greater geographical diversity 
on their Board, in a way that guaranteed developing country representation. It required that four members were from 
Asia/Oceania, four from Europe, four from North America, one from Africa, one from South America, and two others, In 




Basel Committee expanded further to include all G20 countries that were not yet members 
(Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey), along with Hong Kong and 
Singapore. As Figure 1 illustrates, this closed a remarkably large gap in the degree of 
representation in the Basle Committee in terms of the countries which supervise the largest 
fifty banks in the world. However, countries with relatively smaller banks are still not 
adequately represented, which means that banking regulation may continue to reflect 
excessively the interests of large banks.  
 
11. Secondly, the Committee on Payments and Settlement System has welcomed in July 
2009 the following new members: Australia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa and South Korea. The CPSS is another Basel-based body which serves 
as a forum for central bank to monitor and analyse development in domestic payment, 
settlement and clearing systems as well as in cross-border and multicurrency settlement 
schemes. 
 
Table 1: Recent Membership Reforms (1)(2) 
12. Major Global Financial Regulatory Standard Setting Institutions: Country membership 
as of July 2009 (new country since September 2008 in bold and capitalized; members 
before September 2008 pale and small). 
 





Argentina X (1) X   
Australia x (2) X x X 
Belgium  X  X 
Brazil X (3) X X X 
Canada x (3) X x (2) X 
China X (3) X X X 
France x (3) X x x 
Germany x (3) X x x 
Hong Kong x (1) X x x 
India X (3) X X X 
Indonesia X (1) X   
Italy x (3) X x x 
Japan x (3) X x x 
Luxembourg  X   
Mexico X (2) X x X 
Netherlands x (2) X x x 
Russia X (3) X  X 
Saudi Arabia X (1) X  X 
Singapore x (1) X  x 
South Africa X (1) X  X 
South Korea X (2) X  X 
Spain X (2) x x  
Sweden  x  x 
Switzerland x (2) x x x 
Turkey X (1) X   
UK x (3) x x x 
US x (3) x x  x 
(1) Numbers in parentheses show number of members per country. 
(2) Source: Helleiner Eric, and Stefano Pagliari (forthcoming), “Crisis and the Reform of International Financial 
Regulation”. In Helleiner E., Pagliari S., and Zimmerman H., Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International 





13. Thirdly, in the spring of 2009, the Financial Stability Forum increased its membership 
to include the entire G-20, (this including the largest developing countries) plus Spain and the 
European Commission, and has since been renamed the Financial Stability Board, to reflect 
that it would be given additional powers. This expansion of membership was also significant, 
as shown by Figures 2 and 3 below which illustrate that, measured both in terms of 
distribution of world reserves and world savings, the Financial Stability Board now has much 
more equitable representation than its predecessor.  
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Top Fifty Banks (by Market Capitalization) with Regulators Represented in the 










8.Values, for total reserves in US dollars, and exclude Gold holdings, from end 2007. Source: World Bank World 
Development Indicators. Based on Griffith-Jones and Young (2009), IPD Hewlett Policy Brief: Reforming governance of 
international financial regulation: have the G-20 done enough? www.policydialogue.org 
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14. The changes in the FSF/B imply a dramatic increase in the representation of developing 
countries, which is to be greatly welcomed. There are however two rather important caveats. 
The first one refers to the number of representatives. Even before the expansion, the Financial 
Stability Board had two classes of members: the G7 each had three representatives (finance 
ministry, central bank and supervisory authority), whereas the other five member countries 
(Australia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland) were only allowed one. 
With the new 2009 expansion, three classes of countries were created: the BRICs (Brazil, 
China, India, Russia) joined the G7 countries with three representatives each, while Australia, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, South Korea and Switzerland were now assigned two, and 
everyone else was left with one (Argentina, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa and Turkey). Therefore (except for the BRICs), emerging economies 
represented in the FSB have only one or two representatives, whilst the G7 all have three. As 
we discuss in more detail below, poorer and smaller economies are not at all represented. 
 
15. The second caveat relates to the fact that the FSB is now structured not just around a 
plenary, but also around a Steering Committee and three Standing Committee-for 
Vulnerabilities Assessment, Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation, (which also has a 
Cross-Border Crisis management Group under it), and a Standards Implementation 
Committee. Whilst this expansion and specialization of the FSB is welcome, as it strengthens 
its role, it is striking that all the Chairs of these five groups, through very distinguished in the 
field of financial stability, come from developed countries. This may indicate that, though 
membership has significantly broadened- which is to be celebrated-, the leadership (via 
Chairs) of these bodies has not been changed. Greater diversity there would seem desirable in 
the future. An interesting example that could be followed is provided by the 4 working 
groups established by the G20 between the Washington November 2008 and London April 




9 Values of gross domestic savings are only available for end-2005; they represent gross domestic savings in US dollars. 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Based on Griffith-Jones and Young (2009), Policy Brief: Reforming 
governance of international financial regulation: have the G-20 done enough? www.policydialogue.org 
 




16. Overall, the above described changes amount to a highly significant expansion of 
representativeness within the global financial regulatory institutions. For the first time, there 
is a degree of inclusion of developing and emerging countries in the major decision-making 
bodies of international financial regulation. This is to be greatly welcomed. In terms of the 
Marlborough House Principles, these reforms increase those bodies’ legitimacy and fair 
representation; hopefully, they will increase their responsiveness, to the interests of 
developing countries, though lack of representation of smallest and poorest countries, is a 
source of concern; so is lack of  progress on transparency and accountability. Finally, the 
effectiveness of these bodies in ensuring national and global financial stability should be 
enhanced by the changes made. But are they enough?  Despite the increase of 
representativeness, broader governance issues remain, which we discuss below, and make 
proposals for further reform. 
 
Proposals for Improving Governance for the Future; A Possible Role for the 
Commonwealth Secretariat 
17. It is very welcome that there has been a significant increase in the participation of 
developing countries in the governance of international regulatory bodies. This should 
enhance their legitimacy and representativeness as financial market regulation is 
acknowledged as a global public good which requires global stakeholders to design it. It 
should also improve their effectiveness, as greater diversity of views—reflecting different 
experiences— should lead to better outcomes. Most importantly, it will allow the concerns of 
a diversity of developing countries to be better reflected in international regulatory 
arrangements. Despite these important steps, a number of other improvements could further 
enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the newly reformed institutions. We propose 
below four further improvements to the system of global financial regulatory governance that 
should be made: 
 
1) Small and medium countries should have representation in international 
regulatory bodies  
This will firstly, and most importantly, ensure that their concerns (e.g. of simpler 
regulations, as well as of ensuring greater regulatory power of smaller countries over 
large international banks, via for example host country regulations) are heard. 
Secondly, regulation would reflect less exclusively the interests and preferences of 
large internationally oriented banks, and be more appropriate for regulating smaller 
banks, that are usually domestically oriented. Whilst keeping the existing membership, 
additionally small and medium countries should be represented in international 
regulatory bodies. This could be done on a rotating regional basis, with  one (and 
ideally two) representatives from  countries in each of Asia, Africa and Middle East and 
Latin America and the Caribbean. A precedent for this is the IASB model discussed 
above in footnote 9. 
 
This is a fairly modest proposal for change, but one that would crucially ensure some 
voice to smaller and poorer countries, who could sit at the regulatory table. It is 
consistent with the Marlborough House Principles. It would also have the advantage of 
increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of these G-20 bodies, (that are of course far 
more legitimate than previous G-7 or G-10 bodies) by making them open to the rest of 
the developing world. It seems urgent to introduce such changes soon, before the new 





It needs to be emphasized that this is a modest proposal for minimum reform to give 
voice to smaller and poorer countries, that can be easily done. More ambitious ones 
would suggest introducing a constituency system into regulatory bodies (along the lines 
of that  at the IMF or the GEF, the General Environment Facility),  but this would 
imply a major overhaul of governance that may be more difficult to achieve at present, 
given the urgency of focusing on major regulatory reforms, that arise from the crisis. 
 
2) Inclusion of representatives from non-financial stakeholders, such as unions, and 
non-financial corporations in international, as well as national, financial regulatory 
bodies  
This would help ensure that the concerns, needs and perspectives of these groups 
(focused on sustained growth, employment, access to stable credit and long term 
financial stability) balanced the interests of a financial services industry often more 
unilaterally focused on short-term financial profits. For the non financial corporations it 
would be important to include some representation from both large as well as small and 
medium enterprises, the latter particularly important in developing countries. Trustees 
of pension funds could also be represented. 
 
3) Financial regulatory bodies should be made accountable to established forms of 
political representation.  
This may include some system of accountability to national parliaments by national 
regulators and, reflecting international financial interdependence and globalization, 
should include accountability of international regulatory bodies to multilateral 
democratic institutions such as the United Nations.  
 
4) Creating a body for supporting developing countries in their interactions with the 
international financial services regulatory bodies.  
The benefits of the positive move to include developing countries in key international 
regulatory bodies such as the FSF/B and the BCBS could be strengthened by the 
creation of a technical secretariat to support developing countries in their interactions 
with these bodies, both as members and non members This secretariat could prepare or 
commission studies, provide a forum for debate amongst developing countries and 
help—where relevant—to define developing country positions on regulatory issues and 
needs, especially those that require international and/or developed country action. 
Examples include international regulation of the carry trade which can have very pro-
cyclical-and thus negative-effects-on developing countries’ exchange rates or 
regulating unhedged currency mismatches. Both these issues are particularly relevant 
for developing counties. 
 
There may be a particular role for the Commonwealth Secretariat in supporting this 
objective, depending on the level of resources that could be devoted to such an 
initiative.  There is scope for the Secretariat to support the membership through 
research and the dissemination of best practice.  
 
The Commonwealth Secretariat could also offer crucial intangible assets, such as its 
trusted relationship with its members;  its convening power, and its broad membership, 




smaller and poorer countries, the latter being currently excluded from international 
regulatory bodies. 
 
A first meeting could be organized and hosted in London by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and relevant regulatory bodies. This could for example have one or several 
panels on key regulatory issues of particular relevance for developing countries, such as 
lessons from the mistakes that led to the global crisis and from current regulatory 
debates, taking place mainly in developed countries. Possible issues to be discussed 
would be on how to introduce counter-cyclicality into developing country regulation, 
how much should the regulatory perimeter be expanded in different categories of 
developing countries, as well as others. It could also provide a forum for discussing the  
establishment of a more formal group, that would meet regularly (e.g. once or twice a 
year), and possibly have some of the characteristics described above. 
 
More broadly, the Commonwealth Secretariat could also organize regional meetings, 
on these subjects, particularly in regions, where it has an important membership and 
particularly large convening power. This could for example lead to meetings in the 
Caribbean region and the Pacific Islands. However, it could be important always to 
bring relevant regulatory expertise from other countries, both developing and 
developed. The Commonwealth secretariat network and membership could provide a 
valuable resource there. 
 
A Commonwealth network of this sort could be a prelude to, or developed in 
conjunction with a wider forum for supporting developing countries in this area.  
Developing countries have benefited greatly from the support of the very successful 
Group of 24 (G-24), which helps them develop their positions in relation to IMF and 
World Bank matters; a similar body, possibly linked to the G-24, could be created by 
developing countries for international regulatory issues, to help define developing 
country positions at the FSF/B, BCBS, and other relevant regulatory bodies. Such a 
group could ultimately be based in Basel and could help increase both the effectiveness 
and responsiveness of the new broadened regulatory bodies both to developing country 
needs and globally.  
 
Overcoming Fragmentation of Regulation; Moving Towards a Global Financial 
Regulator?   
18. International prudential regulation has developed in a relatively fragmented, and weak 
institutional context. 10  But finance is globally integrated and there is an increasing mismatch 
between the financial services industry and its accompanying international regulatory 
structure. The design and creation of a global financial regulator is one of the main 
institutional challenges that the international community faces after the global financial crisis. 
The aim should be for the domain of the market to be consistent with the domain of the 
regulator, and thus avoid regulatory arbitrage between countries and financial centers, it is a 
highly desirable option to work toward. By pooling and sharing their power internationally 
regulators would be increasing their joint control over global financial markets, so those can 
better serve public policy goals. This would help to make costly financial crises less likely in 
the future. 
                                                           
10 For a good analysis, see Helleiner and Pagliari, “Crisis and the Reform of International Financial Regulation,” 
forthcoming, 2009; see also Griffith-Jones and Young, “Institutional Incentives and Geopolitical Representation in Global 





19. In the past implementation of financial regulation and supervision has been mainly 
located at the national level, with most international financial regulatory agreements simply 
taking the forms of “best practice” standards, and “principles” which are not legally binding 
between regulators (Helleiner and Pagliari, op cit). Developing countries however often have 
to, or feel they have to, follow those standards, either because they are part of IMF or World 
Bank conditionality, or because “financial markets” pressure them indirectly to do so.  This is 
no longer appropriate.  
 
Criteria for Financial Regulation 
20. The purpose of a global financial regulator is to to ensure that the financial sector 
serves the real economy, and thus the needs of households and enterprises to consume and 
invest. On the positive side, governments should encourage the financial sector to create 
financial innovations and instruments that support growth and development in a sustainable 
way (UN Commission, 2009). But they should also use regulation to avoid systemic risk 
being generated, thus preventing future crises, which can be so disruptive to the real economy 
and which tend to be very costly from a fiscal and a development point of view given their 
impact on lost output and investment. Above all, future crises must be prevented because of 
their impact on the lives of people, many of whom are poor and have no responsibility for the 
crisis, especially those living in developing countries. 
 
21. The global financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 follows many deep and 
costly financial crises in developing economies over the last 30 years. This more recent crisis, 
like previous ones, is the result of both inherent flaws in the way financial markets operate- 
and their inherent tendency towards boom bust behaviour-and insufficient, incomplete and 
sometimes inappropriate regulation. 
 
22. To reduce the prospect of future crises regulation should be guided by two key 
principles: comprehensiveness and counter-cyclicality – which have been backed by most 
leading recent international and national reports on regulatory reform  and rhetorically at least  




23. With regard to comprehensiveness12, in order for regulation to be efficient, it is 
essential that the domain of the regulator is the same as the domain of the market that is being 
regulated. The crisis has shown that globalized private financial players are supported by 
increasingly internationalised lender of last resort facilities. Without stronger international 
financial regulation to complement this, moral hazard will significantly increase once again 
as financial activity and risk-taking will grow rapidly in areas where international regulatory 
gaps exist, but there is implicit or explicit coverage by lender-of-last resort facilities. Perhaps 
more importantly, regulatory arbitrage will take place where regulatory gaps exist.  
 
                                                           
11 See again Jane D’Arista and Stephany Griffith–Jones, (op. cit.). 
12 For a fuller discusson see, for example, Jane D’Arista and Stephany Griffith–Jones “Agenda and Criteria for Financial 
Regulatory Reform;”   in Stephany Griffith–Jones, Joseph Stiglitz and Jose Antonio Ocampo (eds), Time for a Visible Hand; 





24. A global regulatory institution seems an essential condition to efficiently implement 
comprehensive international regulation of institutions and markets that engage in 
international transactions. This seems particularly desirable from the perspective of 
developing country interests, as long as developing countries are appropriately and 
effectively represented in such international regulatory fora.  
 
Counter-cyclicality 
25. A key market failure in the financial system is the pro-cyclical behaviour of most 
financial actors, which leads to excessive risk-taking and financial activity in good times, 
followed by insufficient risk-taking and financial activity in bad times.  
 
26. Counter-cyclical regulation implies that the traditional microeconomic focus of 
prudential regulation and supervision be complemented by a macro-prudential perspective, 
particularly by introducing explicit counter-cyclical features in prudential regulation and 
supervision that would compensate for the pro-cyclicality of financial markets.  
 
The Functions and Characteristics of a GFR 
27. A global financial regulator embodying these characteristics would design standards to 
be applied by all countries and jurisdictions, and adopt appropriate surveillance mechanisms 
to guarantee that those standards are adopted. The institutional set up should, however, leave 
room to adapt regulations to different national conditions, and in this sense as well as in the 
area of supervision, operate essentially as a network of national regulators with strong 
international coordination. For example, counter-cyclical regulation criteria could be agreed 
internationally, but then be implemented nationally depending on the state of the cycle in 
each country. As the Geneva Report (2009) argued, such national regulation would best be 
applied by host regulators on local banks and systemic subsidiaries. Also, national financial 
institutions without global connections – e.g., small national banks — would continue to be 
regulated nationally.13  
 
28. A key question is whether a new institution should be created to fulfil this function. 
Given the difficulty of achieving consensus for creating new international institutions, it may 
be desirable to adapt an existing one. It seems that the most appropriate would be the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), given its concern with systemic risk in financial markets 
and the need for regulating them, the high quality of its analysis, and its close links with 
central banks and regulatory bodies. However, a pre-condition for the BIS to provide the 
basis for a global financial authority is that its membership should expand considerably, with 
the aim of creating a universal body, with developing countries adequately represented on its 
Board, management, and staff. Some steps have been taken in this direction (see above), but 
these are clearly insufficient. The accountability of the national representatives of the BIS to 
Parliaments would also be important. Furthermore, it is clearly central that the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), to which the BIS provides a secretariat, should be incorporated into 
such a global regulator and should play a key part in such an institution. 
 
29. Additionally, there should be close consultation with the IMF on the macroeconomic 
aspects of risks, both globally and at country level, a subject also studied by the BIS. The 
IMF, however, is not the appropriate financial institution to take over the task of global 
                                                           
13 Reddy, Y.V. “Regulation of Financial Sector in Developing Countries: Lessons from the 2008 Financial Crisis” in Time 
for a Visible Hand: Lessons from the 2008 World Financial Crisis, Griffith-Jones, S, Ocampo, J.A. and Stiglitz, J., eds. New 




regulator,, as it has limited expertise in the design of regulatory standards, a role played by 
the FSF and the Basle Committee. Furthermore, the IMF has been too closely involved in the 
recent past to the deregulation of financial markets. 
 
30. An important issue is to ensure that the new global regulator is not just effective and 
efficient, but also representative. For this reason, it is important that developing countries are 
adequately represented. It is encouraging that all G-20 members will now be represented in 
the Financial Stability Board, and as discussed above, the Basel Banking Committee. 
However, further steps are clearly necessary to ensure broader representation in international 
regulatory bodies, both of countries and non-financial stakeholders, along the lines out lines 
above, and in according with the Marlborough House Principles.  
 
31. It is particularly important that a global regulator should have real power to influence 
the decisions of national regulators, especially in all the major countries whose financial 
systems have systemic global impact on the rest of the world economy.  
 
32. The design and creation of a global financial regulatory structure is one of the main 
institutional challenges that the international community faces in the wake of the current 
financial crisis. It would allow the principles of regulation to be implemented globally, thus 
avoiding regulatory arbitrage, and helping prevent future crises. This does not eliminate the 
possibility of segmenting national markets by introducing capital controls that should remain 
the right of national authorities. The desire to introduce capital controls will increase if 
regulation is seen as insufficient to curb volatility of capital flows. Therefore those favouring 
continued globalized finance should become the greatest supporters of increasing 
effectiveness of financial regulation, including the design of stronger and more representative 
global financial regulatory structures.  
 
The Case for a Global Financial Regulator (GFR) 
33. The international community has taken important and valuable steps toward global 
coordinated regulation, such as the creation of the Financial Stability Forum and recently its 
transformation into the Financial Stability Board, which has more powers and staff. The 
concept of international colleges of supervisors is another step in this direction. However, 
their efforts are clearly insufficient, given the speed and depth of the globalization of private 
finance and its often negative spillover effects on innocent bystanders. 
 
34. Indeed, in terms of new institutional arrangements for regulation, it is essential to 
design an institutional structure consistent with the fact that capital and banking markets have 
very large parts that operate at a global level. For the domain of the market to be consistent 
with the domain of the regulator, and to thus avoid regulatory arbitrage between countries 
and financial centres, a global financial regulator seems very desirable to help provide the 
regulatory coordination on needed for pursuing the global public good of global financial 
stability. Both academics14 and some market actors15 have long called for such an institution. 
The recent crisis – and the way contagion has spread throughout the globe to even affect 
countries with sound financial systems – has made such an institution more necessary and 
politically more feasible. 
 
                                                           
14 See  Eatwell, J. & Taylor, L. “Global Finance at Risk: The Case for International Regulation” New York: The New Press, 
2000. 




35. One reason why governments – both in developed and developing countries – may 
resist calls for a global regulator is their unwillingness to give up perceived national 
sovereignty in the area of financial regulation – where they see sovereignty to be important. 
However, this perception is incorrect, given the globalization of private finance. 
 
36. Global financial markets, to the extent that they are unregulated, are profoundly 
unaccountable and undemocratic. These markets have major and profound effects on 
economies and on people’s lives, many of which are undesirable, due to serious market 
failures especially pervasive in the financial sector. This is a major factor in undermining 
national and global financial stability.  
 
37. Such market failures can only be corrected by government actions, such as by 
regulation. To the extent that financial markets are global, the only option for effective 
regulation is for sovereignty to be pooled or shared among governments via global 
arrangements. Therefore, by sharing sovereignty, countries will gain sovereignty, by 
increasing their joint control over global financial markets so that these can serve public 
policy goals, such as financial stability, that will contribute to sustained growth. This is 
clearly a superior option in terms of the exercise of sovereignty compared to individual 
governments not being able to regulate the international aspects of finance.  
 
38. Developing country governments may feel particularly unwilling to support the 
creation of a global financial regulator, because they may fear it will be used to impose 
regulations on them that would reduce their policy space. This was basically true, when 
finance was mainly controlled by developed countries and actors, and crises happened mainly 
in developing countries (even though often largely caused by international financial markets). 
However, the situation has now changed. Much of global savings originates in developing 
economies, while the current crisis clearly originated in the developed economies; regulatory 
failures in these developed countries were a major cause of this crisis. Furthermore, 
developing economies and their people have severely suffered the effects of the crisis through 
a variety of channels even though they had no responsibility for causing it.  
 
39. Therefore, it is in the interests of developing countries to have a global financial 
regulator (in which they have appropriate representation), to ensure that global financial 
markets are adequately regulated. The fact that there is now greater, though still insufficient, 
developing country representation, than in the past, in the main international regulatory 
bodies, such as the FSB and the BCBS, makes an international regulator more attractive for 
developing economies. Its existence would help avoid future crises, especially those 
originating in developed economies.   
 
 
